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22 JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General
(Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October 1961
Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)

REFERENCES: (a) USIB-D-34/4/2 of 21 May 1962
(b) AD/SI memo to DD/I dated 11 Jan 62,
same subject

1. In accordance with your request, this memorandum contains OSI's comments on the subject report by the Assistant for Coordination which was distributed to USIB members by reference (a). Review of this report in the light of OSI's comments on the previous draft, contained in reference (b), reveals that all suggested changes have been taken into account except as noted below:

2. With regard to Section 6 of the report, concerning the collection and analysis of Soviet telemetry, [redacted] the Agency ELINT Staff Officer, has provided the following comments:

a. "Section 6 of the subject report is identical to a final draft provided to this Office by the Coordination Staff after numerous preliminary conferences on various aspects of the matter. Although many of the points offered by this Office were not acceptable to the Coordination Staff, Section 6 represents their efforts to incorporate our views and still preserve the points which they intend to make. While we could "live with" the reports as written, it will create more problems than it will solve. Two potential problem areas, one of primary interest to the DD/R, the other to the AD/SI, are of particular importance.



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referenced proposal again re-opens this question and resolution will be based on an interpretation of the phrase, "... and their appropriate responsiveness to the technical and operational control of the Director NSA." CIA will continue to interpret this phrase so as to permit the full utilization of all CIA facilities and will incorporate all possible technical recommendations in order to assist the Director, NSA, in carrying out his general responsibilities. However, CIA must retain supervision of the project in order that the other requirements of operating a covert site can be met.

c. The reference also points out that another complicating factor is the statement in NSCID-6 which specifies "that NSA not engage in the production of finished intelligence as distinguished from intelligence information." As in every field of intelligence endeavor, the lines of responsibility are often somewhat arbitrarily drawn. The only problem which has resulted in this area stems from the NSA desire and practice of extending responsibility beyond the limits of NSCID-6. The limits as drawn are generally considered to be the most logical that can be defined, and NSA intrusion into the field of intelligence, national estimates, and all that is entailed in revision of the problem area stated in the reference, would create a chaotic situation. It is also pertinent that in a recent gesture, NSA attempted to unilaterally regulate this area of intelligence by proposing security regulations that would preclude the use of intelligence information by many regular users. Actions such as this should give pause to further broadening of NSA responsibility. If such a review is to be made, it should be done under the DCI or the USIB structure."

3. Attached hereto is a proposed rewrite, prepared by [redacted] of Section 6 of the Coordination Staff draft which retains as much of the original as is possible.

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5. Also, in Section 8, there is no discussion of a most critical analytical situation, namely, the general paucity of well-qualified personnel to work on scientific and technical intelligence problems. It is our considered judgement that the total number of technical intelligence analysts in comparison with numbers working in other fields is entirely inadequate to the task. We continue to feel that we must increase greatly the proportionate effort going to analysis in relation to that going to collection. We believe this is the key problem rather than duplication of effort which, in our opinion, is a minor problem in view of the scarcity of qualified personnel.

6. Although not of primary concern to this Office, we feel it might be of interest in this report to mention the role of the DD/R in Section 7 on technical collection. Based on OSI's experience in

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recent years dealing with the development of major technical collection projects, we would like to re-emphasize our conviction that such projects can be effectively developed and operated only if both the responsibility and the necessary funds are vested in one person.

[Redacted]

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ALBERT D. WHEELON
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

[Redacted]

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Attachment:

Proposed Rewrite of Section 6 of the
Coordination Staff draft

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 2 - AD/SI
- 3 - Staff/SI

OSI:Staff: [Redacted] (22 June 1962)

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Exploitation of these tapes for intelligence information is now delegated to CIA by NSA, and as experience has shown the advantages of this arrangement, it should be continued. The synthesis of all ELINT with other information for the production of intelligence should continue to be the responsibility of the Services and CIA.

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